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TEACHING TREATIES: 
TREATY ABROGATION AND THE RULE 
AGAINST PERPETUITIES: 
SEVENTEEN QUOTATIONS AND TWO GRAPHS 
TO GET STUDENTS TALKING 
ROBERT LAURENCE* 
 
Preliminary Commentary 
 
This is me.  What you read following each quotation or graph is my 
commentary upon the material that I present to my students, via handouts, 
as we study Indian treaties. 
To begin with, unlike most of the other Indian law courses discussed at 
this Symposium, in mine—taught in a state without Indian Country, and to 
an audience almost entirely non-Indian—it is important to begin non-
historically and not with the Marshall Trilogy, as discussed elsewhere in 
these pages.  My students need to see on the very first day of class an Indian 
tribe as a modern functioning government.  So, at the outset of the semester 
we spend about three or four hours discussing a case called United States v. 
Ant,1 which is a largely uncommented-upon case involving the federal 
prosecution of a tribal member who has already been convicted, without 
having been Miranda-ized, before the tribal court.  Ant introduces my 
students to tribes as governments, and it also serves very nicely as a way of 
setting forth what I call the seven basic principles of the entire course.2  One 
of those principles, little involved in Ant itself, is the existence, 
enforceability, and abrogability of Indian treaties. 
Leaving these seven principles aside, we then plunge into a careful and 
wide-ranging discussion of the concept of tribal, state, and national 
sovereignty, and of the plenary power of Congress over the tribes.  You 
might see, for example, an obscure article in the Tulsa Law Review.3  When 
we return near mid-semester to the direct study of treaties, the assignment 
 
 *Robert A. Leflar Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Arkansas. 
1. 882 F.2d 1389 (9th Cir. 1988). 
2. See generally Robert Laurence, The Basic Principles of American Law as They Apply to 
American Indian Tribes, 5 Y.B. N.Z. JURISPRUDENCE 35 (2003). 
3. Robert Laurence, Don’t Think of a Hippopotamus: An Essay on First Year-Contracts, 
Earthquake Prediction, Gun Control in Baghdad, the Indian Civil Rights Act, the Clean Water 
Act, and Justice Thomas’s Separate Opinion in United States v. Lara, 40 TULSA L. REV. 137 
(2004). 
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for class is the Dion case, but, as class begins, and without mentioning 
either the assignment or Indian treaties, I put the Rule Against Perpetuities 
(RAP) on the floor. 
 
And, with that introduction, my nineteen quotations and two graphs 
follow. 
I. 
“No interest in property is good unless it must vest, if at all, within 21 
years following a life or lives-in-being at the creation of the estate.”4 
 
Commentary 
 
The Rule Against Perpetuities is not usually among the most-loved 
recollections of the first-year property course for most upper-class students.  
Getting this statement out of them is a little like tooth-pulling, and here in 
Indian law, I am not practicing that kind of dentistry, worthy though it 
might be in other circumstances.  After a couple of good-faith efforts, I 
stand ready to lay the RAP upon them. 
II. 
“A person may control the use and disposition of his or her property 
for only a relatively short period of time after his or her death.”5 
 
Commentary 
 
Of more use for present purposes than the bar-exam RAP, is a 
statement like this one, which goes to the essence of the rule, leaving out 
most of the detail.  It is easiest to get this kind of plain-language translation 
out of the students if there is a non-law student in the class, as there is in 
mine occasionally, but not regularly.  Just ask the law students to explain 
the RAP to the present (or an imagined) intelligent non-law student.  A 
statement such as this one—designed for discussion by non-lawyers, but not 
for bar-exam use—captures the essential policy conflict presented by the 
RAP.  On one side, we have the interests of the “Dead Hand,” that is to say 
the desire of property owners to control the property they own and to 
 
4. This is a traditional statement of the Rule Against Perpetuities, whose origins lie in The 
Duke of Norfolk’s Case, 3 Ch. Cas. 1, 22 Eng. Rep. 931 (1682). 
5. This is a statement of the Rule Against Perpetuities as it might be explained to an 
intelligent non-lawyer. 
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determine future owners even after they are dead.6  On the other side is the 
“Living Hand,” the understandable inclination of the living to think that 
they are the ones who best know how property should be used, and to think 
that the dead should be content simply to be dead. 
III. 
“Great nations, like great men, must keep their word.  When America 
says something, America means it, whether a treaty or an agreement or a 
vow made on marble steps.”7 
 
IV. 
“Last week we conducted another promising test of our missile defense 
technology. For the good of peace, we’re moving forward with an active 
program to determine what works and what does not work.  In order to do 
so, we must move beyond the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, a treaty 
that was written in a different era for a different enemy. America and our 
allies must not be bound to the past.  We must be able to build the defenses 
we need against the enemies of the 21st  century.”8 
 
Commentary 
 
These two statements by the George Bushes, perè et fils, capture as 
nicely as any the conflict to which the Rule Against Perpetuities is the 
compromise, now with respect to treaties and not property rights.  (If 
there’s a difference.  Justice Thomas has suggested that there isn’t).9  
President Bush, perè, here represents the interests of the Dead Hand and the 
idea that promises, once made, should be kept.  His inaugural comment is 
 
6. For a nice fictional rendition of this desire, written so as to question the wisdom of the 
Dead Hand, see Nevil Shute’s 1950 book, The Legacy, which was made into the film A Town Like 
Alice.  For a real-life battle, here stated passionately in support of the Dead Hand, see Hilton 
Kramer, Looting Dr. Barnes: Philly Plutocrats Plunder a Legacy, N.Y. OBSERVER, Oct. 13, 2003, 
(Arts & Entertainment) at 1. 
7. President George H.W. Bush, Inaugural Address, 1 PUBLIC PAPERS OF GEORGE BUSH 1, 3 
(Jan. 20, 1989).  See Fed. Power Comm’n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 142 (1960) 
(Black, J., dissenting) (“Great nations, like great men, should keep their word.  When America 
says something, America means it, whether a treaty or an agreement or a vow made on marble 
steps.”) (emphasis added).  President Bush substituted “must” for Justice Black’s “should” in the 
first sentence. 
8. President George W. Bush, Remarks at The Citadel, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1500, 1504 (Dec. 11, 
2001) available at 2001 WL 1571476 (F.D.C.H.). 
9. See Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 220 (1999) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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especially apt in Indian law, of course, as he is quoting (almost) from 
Justice Black’s famous dissent in the Tuscarora case, (which everyone, 
including me, needs to remember was not a treaty case). 
President Bush, fils, here takes the position that times change in ways 
unanticipated by those who crafted the exchange of promises that is called a 
treaty, and the living are the ones in the best position to decide what the 
present rules should be, not those who are dead, retired, out-of-the-loop, or 
unelected. 
V. 
“The message from this Administration, from those of us up here today, 
is this: You should keep the promises you make to your workers.  If you 
offer a private pension plan to your employees, you have a duty to set aside 
enough money now so your workers will get what they’ve been promised 
when they retire.”10 
VI. 
“Delta Air Lines’ lawyer said a bankruptcy judge will be playing 
‘Russian roulette’ with the company’s future if he denies its motion to 
terminate a traditional pension plan for pilots.  Scuttling the plan for 
thousands of retired pilots is ‘horrible,’ Delta lawyer Marshall Huebner 
said Friday in a court hearing on the issue, ‘but the simple thing is that 
Delta will not survive unless the plan is terminated.’  In a preview of the 
arguments U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Adlai Hardin will hear, one group of 
retired pilots opposed Delta’s move, saying the airline is exaggerating the 
risks of keeping the plan.  Another retired pilot group said termination is 
probably necessary, and the airline’s creditors said there’s no other way to 
save the company.”11 
 
Commentary 
 
Now here in the first of these two quotations we have the present 
President Bush following his father’s lead and emphasizing the sanctity of 
promises.  Which is not to say that he necessarily disagrees with the 
position of Delta’s management—now as Debtor-in-Possession in the 
bankruptcy proceeding—that the deal originally promised to the now-
 
10. President George W. Bush, Remarks at the Signing of The Pension Protection Act of 
2006 (Aug. 17, 2006) 2006 WL 2375038 (F.D.C.H.). 
11. Russell Grantham, First Salvos Fired in Delta Battle, ATLANTA J.-CONSTITUTION, Sept. 
2, 2006, at 1B. 
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retired pilots must be undone by one side acting alone.  As is often the case, 
the battle between the Dead and Living Hands—or here the Debtor-in-
Possession and the Retirees—is a difficult one to manage, as Delta’s lawyer 
clearly expresses.  That the retired pilots are themselves conflicted shows 
the difficulty of the issue, as, in fact, does the Pension Protection Act of 
2006, which inter alia, provides a governmental insurance policy to protect 
the retirees of defaulting pension providers.  The Rule Against Perpetuities 
is complicated exactly because it needs to be. 
VII. 
“A covenant marriage is a marriage entered into by one (1) male and 
one (1) female who understand and agree that the marriage between them 
is a lifelong relationship . . . .  Only when there has been a complete and 
total breach of the marital covenant commitment may a party seek a 
declaration that the marriage is no longer legally recognized.”12 
 
Commentary 
 
When it comes to the keeping, or not, of out-of-date promises, twenty-
first century America’s best example, of course, is divorce.  The “great 
men” of George Bush, perè, and Justice Black, are doing a rather poor job 
lately maintaining the vows of marriage, but who, exactly, would return to 
the days before Henry VIII?  A compromise position is the so-called 
“covenant marriage,” where the parties are permitted voluntarily to bind 
themselves to a more restrictive divorce regimen, and, once having chosen 
that route, may not then voluntarily undo the choice, and opt back into a 
more liberal regimen, even if that is the desire of both parties, as the 
marriage begins to unwind.  Anecdotally, it appears that covenant marriage 
is more popular among 50-somethings, re-committing themselves to an 
already comfortable relationship, than among 20-somethings, about to 
embark upon the peculiar undertaking we call marriage.13 
 
12. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-803(a)(1), (3) (2006).  See generally Chauncey E. Brummer, 
The Shackles of Covenant Marriage: Who Holds the Keys to Wedlock?, 25 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK 
L. REV. 261 (2003). 
13. See David Holman, A New Covenant, AM. SPECTATOR ONLINE, Mar. 4, 2005 (on file 
with author). 
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VIII. 
“We must presume that Congress acted in perfect good faith in the 
dealings with the Indians of which complaint is made, and that the legisla-
tive branch of the government exercised its best judgment in the premises.  
In any event, as Congress possessed full power in the matter, the judiciary 
cannot question or inquire into the motives which prompted the enactment 
of this legislation.  If injury was occasioned, which we do not wish to be 
understood as implying, by the use made by Congress of its power, relief 
must be sought by an appeal to that body for redress and not to the courts.  
The legislation in question was constitutional, and the demurrer to the bill 
was therefore rightly sustained.”14 
 
Commentary 
 
So finally we come to Lone Wolf, which famously held that Indian 
treaties are abrogable by one side acting alone, or, more precisely, that it 
was not a violation of constitutional due process for the United States to 
walk away from the obligations of an Indian treaty.  The case is dreadfully 
written, full of early twentieth century racist rhetoric, but its result is almost 
unremarkable, when it is related back to Presidents Bush, perè et fils, the 
Rule Against Perpetuities, and the Dead versus Living Hand.  At least put it 
this way: it would have been extraordinarily protective of the Dead Hand 
had the Supreme Court enjoined the abrogation of treaty by the Executive, 
and held that the only way treaty obligations could be changed would be by 
re-negotiating the treaty and re-submitting it to the Senate for ratification. 
 
14. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 568 (1903). 
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IX. 
THE WHITE HOUSE 
February 28, 2005   
MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL   
SUBJECT: Compliance with the Decision of the International Court of 
Justice in Avena 
The United States is a party to the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations (the ‘Convention’) and the Convention’s Optional Protocol 
Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes (Optional Protocol), 
which gives the International Court of Justice (ICJ) jurisdiction to decide 
disputes concerning the “interpretation and application” of the 
Convention. 
I have determined, pursuant to the authority vested in me as President 
by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, that the 
United States will discharge its inter-national obligations under the 
decision of the International Court of Justice in the Case Concerning Avena 
and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America) 
(Avena), 2004 ICJ 128 (Mar. 31), by having State courts give effect to the 
decision in accordance with general principles of comity in cases filed by 
the 51 Mexican nationals addressed in that decision. 
George W. Bush15 
 
Commentary 
 
The earlier quotation of Bush, fils, on the ABM treaty necessarily 
raises the issue of whether the same rules apply, and whether the same com-
promises should be made, regarding international treaties.  I am interested 
here in the treatment of international treaties under domestic American law, 
and not their treatment under international law, about which I am both 
largely ignorant and largely unconcerned.  This quotation, showing the 
President’s artful resolution of the compromise regarding the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations, and his subsequent withdrawal from the 
optional protocol of the Convention, shows the complexity of the issue.  
 
15. George W. Bush, Compliance with the Decision of the International Court of Justice in 
Avena (Feb. 28, 2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/ 
20050228-18.html. 
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Adam Ereli, a spokesman for both the Department of State and for the 
Living Hand, explained the determination this way: 
[W]hen we signed up to the optional protocol, it [was] not 
anticipated that . . .cases . . .would be referred to the [International 
Court of Justice] [or that] the optional protocol would be used to 
review cases of domestic criminal law.  This is a development, 
frankly, that we had not anticipated in signing up to the optional 
protocol . . . .16 
X. 
“[T]he question whether a particular measure was appropriate for 
protecting and advancing the tribe’s interests, and therefore not subject to 
the constitutional command of the Just Compensation Clause, is factual in 
nature.  The answer must be based on a consideration of all the evidence 
presented.  We do not mean to imply that a reviewing court is to second-
guess, from the perspective of hindsight, a legislative judgment that a 
particular measure would serve the best interests of the tribe.  We do mean 
to require courts, in considering whether a particular congressional action 
was taken in pursuance of Congress’ power to manage and control tribal 
lands for the Indians’ welfare, to engage in a thoroughgoing and impartial 
examination of the historical record.  A presumption of congressional good 
faith cannot serve to advance such an inquiry.”17 
 
Commentary 
 
It is not too soon to note that some—perhaps many—treaty abrogations 
are compensable.  Sioux Nation is seen to be directly connected to the 
suggestion given by the Supreme Court in Lone Wolf, as the later Court 
agreed with the earlier one that complaints regarding treaty abrogations 
should be taken to the Congress, or, in this case, to the Claims Court, set up 
by Congress to hear complaints for money damages against the United 
States.18 
 
16. State Dep’t Regular Briefing, (Mar. 10, 2005), available at 2005 WL 555679 (F.D.C.H.) 
17. United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 415-16 (1980). 
18. See id. 
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XI. 
“It must always be remembered that the various Indian tribes were 
once independent and sovereign nations, and their claim to sovereignty 
long predates that of our own Government.”19 
 
Commentary 
 
At some point in this discussion—perhaps here, perhaps earlier; 
perhaps via a student’s observation, perhaps via my direct question—the 
difference between Indian treaties and individual property rights will 
become plain, and will thereby tie our discussion of treaties back into the 
earlier discussion—and the dominant theme of the entire course—of tribal 
sovereignty.  Because of the corporate existence of both the tribes and the 
United States, the parties to a treaty are with us still.  Neither being dead, 
there is no occasion for the operation of the Dead Hand.  Technically, at 
least. 
Unless one thinks, however, that the choice between Presidents Bush, 
perè et fils, is easy and clear, the doctrine of tribal sovereignty does not 
solve the question of the abrogability of treaties, but only makes it more 
complex. 
An additional complexity with respect to Indian treaties is that treaty-
making ended in 1871.20  I had long assumed that this Act was entirely 
practical and that theoretically it was an unenforceable statement of policy 
by the forty-first Congress.  Justice Thomas seems to want to lead the Court 
in another direction, and his separate opinion in United States v. Lara21 
tried to give this Act some doctrinal importance.  Be that as it may, or may 
not be, practically speaking, treaty-making with the tribes has ended, 
forever, one suspects, this being a development about which I am somewhat 
ambivalent.22  Thus, in the international situation, an out-moded treaty can 
be renegotiated, even where one of the original parties has now disappeared 
from the international scene; Russia, for example, became the obligor and 
beneficiary of treaties negotiated by the U.S.S.R.  In Indian law, on the 
other hand, we have the unique situation where, under McClanahan, the 
tribal party to the treaty still exists, but under the Act of March 3, 1871, the 
treaty may not be renegotiated with it. 
 
19. McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1973). 
20. See Act of Mar. 3, 1871, c.120 § 1, 16 Stat. 566 (codified as 25 U.S.C. §71). 
21. 541 U.S. 193, 214 (Thomas, J., concurring) (2004). 
22. See Robert Laurence, Antipodean Reflections on American Indian Law, 20 ARIZ. J. INT’L 
& COMP. L. 533 (2003). 
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XII. 
“What is essential is clear evidence that Congress actually considered 
the conflict between its intended action on the one hand and Indian treaty 
rights on the other, and chose to resolve that conflict by abrogating the 
treaty.”23 
 
Commentary 
 
What happened to Dion?  Somewhere in the midst of the discussion of 
the Dead and Living Hands, of the George Bushes, perè et fils, of promise-
keeping and -breaking, I will ease Dion and the hunting of the National 
Bird into the discussion, usually in response to an overly facile statement in 
support of treaty rights by a student whom I guess to be an environ-
mentalist.  In the course of that discussion, I introduce the class to Chief 
Billie’s confrontation with one of the last remaining Florida panthers, puma 
concolor coryi, recounted in United States v. Billie.24  The complete ver-
sions of these two cases, the first to apply the quoted Dion test, become 
reading assignments as the discussion of treaties continues.  The Billie cases 
are especially good for class discussion, both because of the glamour of the 
animal at issue, and because of its virtual indistinguishability of the Florida 
panther from the western cougar, puma concolor, of which there are many. 
 
23. United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 739-40 (1986). 
24. 667 F.Supp. 1485 (S.D. Fla. 1987).  The State of Florida’s parallel prosecution is found 
in State v. Billie, 497 So.2d 889 (Fla. App. 1986). 
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XIII. 
The First Graph 
 
A B C D E F G H 
 
Proposition A: Lone Wolf is wrong and the federal courts should enjoin 
the unilateral abrogation of Indian (and international?) treaties. 
Proposition B: Lone Wolf is right, but Dion is wrong, and the federal 
courts should require the intent to abrogate an Indian treaty to appear on the 
face of the abrogating statute. 
Proposition C: Dion is wrong, but United States v. White, 508 F.2d 453 
(8th Cir. 1974), is right, i.e., the federal courts should require that the intent 
to abrogate be found explicitly on the face of the statute or in the legislative 
history. 
Proposition D: Dion is right, but applies only to the Bald Eagle 
Protection Act. 
Proposition E: Dion is right, and applies beyond the Bald Eagle 
Protection Act, but its application should only be extended carefully. 
Proposition F: Dion is right and should be extended aggressively in 
order to advance the worthy purposes of the various environmental statutes.  
Thus, Billie is right, because of the worthiness of the abrogating statute, i.e. 
the Endangered Species Act. 
Proposition G: Dion is right, but Billie is wrong, because the 
Endangered Species Act is not that important an environmental statute. 
However, a really important statute like the Clean Water Act or the Clean 
Air Act should be found to abrogate Indian treaties by implication. 
Proposition H: Any later statute should abrogate a prior inconsistent 
treaty. 
 
Commentary following the First Chart: 
 
After (usually) considerable struggle with Dion and the Billie cases, I 
force the students to place themselves on the first chart above.  Ordinarily 
they spread themselves out quite nicely across the entire spectrum.  (For 
what it’s worth, after the students have committed themselves to a place on 
the chart,  I place myself at position C) 
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XV. 
“I want you to understand that you are absolutely dependent upon the 
Great Father to-day for a living.  Let the Government send out instructions 
to your agent to cease to issue these rations, let the Government instruct 
your agent to cease to issue your clothes. . . .  Let the Government instruct 
him to cease to issue your supplies, let him take away the money to run your 
schools with, and I want to know what you would do.  Everything you are 
wearing and eating is gratuity.  Take all this away and throw this people 
wholly upon their own responsibility to take care of themselves, and what 
would be the result?  Not one-fourth of your people could live through the 
winter, and when the grass grows again it would be nourished by the dust 
of all the balance of your noble tribe.”25 
XVI. 
“Given the Tribe’s evident concern with reaffirmance of the 
Government’s obligations under the 1858 Treaty, and the Commissioners’ 
tendency to wield the payments as an inducement to sign the agreement, we 
conclude that the saving clause pertains to the continuance of annuities, not 
the 1858 borders.”26 
XVII. 
“ ”27 
 
Commentary 
 
We end here, with two quotations and one non-quotation from the 
Yankton Sioux case.  We have Commissioner Cole’s extraordinarily bare-
knuckled (from a twenty-first century perspective) negotiation style.  We 
have Justice O’Connor’s pragmatic, if cold, use of Mr. Cole’s words.  And 
we have the words that were not written by any Justice: “I concur in the 
result in this case, but write briefly and separately to comment on the 
Court’s use of Commissioner Cole’s statement to the Yankton Sioux during 
the winter of 1892, a time of deep, deep distress . . . .” 
Mr. Ireson’s reformulation of the graph from a linear spectrum into an 
ellipse is most clearly suggested by Commissioner Cole’s statement.  As 
 
25. South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 346-47 (1998) (quoting Council of 
the Yankton Indians (Dec. 10, 1892)). 
26. Id. at 347.  Justice O’Connor wrote for a unanimous Court. 
27. Id. ( ____________, J., concurring in judgment). 
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Mr. Ireson put it: If the United States could then, and can now, impose a 
“renegotiated” change in treaty obligations like that, then how, exactly, is 
Proposition A different from Proposition H?  How indeed? 
Returning to the Yankton case, I ask the students this: which bothers 
you more as a twenty-first century American—that Mr. Cole said such a 
thing in 1892, or that Justice O’Connor used the quotation without batting 
an eye in 1998?  I suspect that if I were teaching the course just now, the 
name of Benedict XVI would arise in the conversation: To what extent 
would the quoting of Mr. Cole’s words serve “to begin a dialogue” with the 
Indians? 
 
Two Quotations in Conclusion 
XVIII. 
“Give me your tired, your poor, 
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free, 
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore. 
Send these, the homeless, tempest-tossed, to me: 
I lift my lamp beside the golden door.” 
Emma Lazarus 
“The New Colossus” (1883) 
XIX. 
“Do I contradict myself? 
Very well then I contradict myself. 
(I am large, I contain multitudes.)” 
Walt Whitman 
“Song of Myself” in Leaves of Grass (1891) 
 
Commentary: Thoughts after the Symposium 
 
One leaves the North Dakota Symposium, both its live and printed 
versions, optimistic about the pedagogy of American Indian law.  The 
Baker Court Room at U.N.D. was, and these pages in the North Dakota 
Law Review are, full of ideas and energy.  The relatively new professors, 
especially, have brought, and are bringing, to the field new missions and 
new enthusiasm, and—that much more remarkable—the earlier generation 
of professors is showing itself willing both to lead the way and to accept the 
offered innovations.  The students of the future are a lucky bunch. 
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As should have been expected, the Symposium did not—and could 
not—separate pedagogy from theory, and most of the offerings, in Grand 
Forks and here, are a nice mix to the two.  (The present essay alone, per-
haps, is pure pedagogy.)  And it is entirely appropriate that two scholars of 
generation-long standing stated most clearly, for me, the two doctrinal 
issues for the next generation to tackle.  First—actually second chrono-
logically, but first logically—Professor Goldberg of UCLA raised the 
fundamental question of when the rules with respect to Indian tribes should 
be the same as those off-reservation, and when they should be different.  I 
took my shot at that question, to no great effect, in the article on symmetry 
and asymmetry,28 but there is much, much more to be done.  Perhaps most 
difficult is this question: of what impact on the law—practical and doctrinal 
impact—is the fact that most all Indian tribes are so very much smaller than 
all states?  How much nationhood can be expected from a county-sized 
government?  It is impossible to ignore this difference, in my view, though 
it is not always the case that the difference makes a difference in the 
outcome.  It is exactly this question, very broadly put, that Professor 
Goldberg set the next generation of scholars to work on. 
Secondly, Professor Pommersheim, of the University of South Dakota, 
asked as plainly as it has ever been asked: What is the perimeter of the 
Plenary Power?  Much of the scholarly work done so far, for good or ill, has 
been pointed toward showing the illegitimacy of the Plenary Power, but, 
without entirely abandoning that position, Professor Pommersheim still 
noted that conceding the existence of the power does not concede its 
infinity.  Any constitutional power must have a perimeter and some hard 
work should be put into finding it.  I, who long ago confessed to being able 
to live with the Plenary Power,29 must admit that I did not even try to 
survey this perimeter, beyond noting that the power, if found in one place in 
the Constitution, would be restricted by other places therein, a rather 
elemental proposition ratified by the court in the Seminole Tribe case.30  
Beyond this, I don’t know, and admit that trying to explain Indian law 
without figuring out the Plenary Power is a little like trying to explain the 
physics of the universe while leaving out gravity.  But Professor 
Pommersheim has set the issue before us and it’s time we tried our hands at 
general relativity. 
 
28. Robert Laurence, Symmetry and Asymmetry in Federal Indian Law, 42 ARIZ. L. REV. 
861 (2000). 
29. Robert Laurence, Learning to Live with the Plenary Power of Congress over the Indian 
Nations, 30 ARIZ. L. REV. 413 (1988). 
30. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
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Now, on closer examination, these two issues for the twenty-first 
century merge, and Professor Pommersheim’s is seen to be but a special 
case of Professor Goldberg’s.  For there are Commerce Clauses in the 
Constitution other than the Indian Commerce Clause, and they have both 
established and emerging perimeters, as the Court has allowed, vel non, 
over the years various acts of Congress.  Thus, Professor Pommersheim’s 
issue, stated in Professor Goldberg’s terminology, is whether the perimeter 
of the Commerce Clause is the same for the tribes as it is for the states.  
What, in the end, does “commerce with the Indian nations” mean?  The new 
scholars and teachers will need to be working there for some years to come, 
a proposition that seems not to daunt them. 
All-in-all, then, I am optimistic about Indian law in the years ahead, 
both in the classroom and in the law journals.  In the United States Reports?  
Well, now, that’s another matter. 
 
